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Abstract 
Although private regulation of labor standards in global supply chains is increasingly adopted 
by firms in diverse industries, a mounting quantum of scholarly evidence suggests that this 
approach has not generated sustainable improvements in working conditions of workers in 
global supply chains. Prior studies attribute this gap between private regulation practices and 
expected outcomes to flaws in each element of the private regulation model or to symbolic 
adoption by firms. The authors draw on recent developments in institutional theory regarding 
practice-outcome decoupling to suggest an alternative organizational field-level explanation. 
Using qualitative and quantitative data from a global apparel supplier and a global home 
products retailer, they demonstrate how actor heterogeneity creates field opacity via practice 
multiplicity, behavioral invisibility and causal complexity, contributing to practice-outcomes 
decoupling.  
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Field Opacity and Practice-Outcomes Decoupling: Private Regulation of Labor Standards in 
Global Supply Chains 
 
 
A variety of private regulation models were adopted by global apparel and footwear 
companies in the early 1990s in response to pressure from activists and consumers over 
sweatshop conditions in global supply chains. The most popular model consists of three 
elements. The first element concerns the setting of standards regarding labor practices in global 
supply chains through a code of conduct  that is generally based on ILO’s conventions; the  
second element, “auditing,” involves checking whether supplier factories comply with the code 
of conduct and is carried out directly by the brands or sub-contracted to specialist auditing 
firms; the third element  incentivizes suppliers to improve compliance with the code by linking 
future sourcing decisions to their compliance records (penalizing or dropping noncompliant 
suppliers and rewarding more compliant ones).   
 On the one hand, this model has diffused among many industries such as horticulture, 
home furnishings, furniture, fish, lumber, fair trade coffee and others, while also spawning a 
complex, burgeoning supportive eco-system of actors and institutions (multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, auditing firms, critical NGOs, and consulting firms).  On the other hand, there is 
steadily mounting scholarly evidence that the model has not generated sustainable 
improvements in living standards of workers in the global supply chains (Appelbaum and 
Lichtenstein 2016). Thus, we have a puzzling situation where this private regulation model 
continues to be adopted despite reports of its ineffectiveness. The research question this paper 
addresses is: Why is there a gap between policies and practices of private regulation and the 
intended outcome of sustainable improvements in labor standards in global supply chains?  
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Two general explanations have been advanced for such a gap. The first, popular among 
critics, has focused on “symbolic adoption”, whereby companies adopt private regulation 
primarily as a strategy to minimize reputational risk, without seriously implementing it (see 
Esbenshade 2004). A second explanation points to faulty assumptions underlying the model’s 
design, and a variety of problems in each step of its’ implementation (e.g., Locke 2013; 
Amengual and Distelhorst 2019). The symbolic adoption thesis does not fully fit the facts, as 
many global companies have not only adopted but have, to varying degrees, implemented a 
private regulation strategy. It is also unlikely that the few cases of specific implementation 
problems which have been unearthed can account for the policy-practice-outcomes gap noted 
in the organizational field of private regulation as a whole. Therefore, we draw on recent 
developments in institutional theory regarding organizational decoupling (Bromley and Powell 
2012; Wijen 2014) to explain the general policy-practice-outcomes gap in private regulation 
with respect to labor standards.       
Our argument is that actor heterogeneity in private regulation of labor standards 
generates opacity that result in practice-outcomes decoupling. More specifically, we develop 
propositions regarding how heterogeneous actors contribute to the three characteristics of field 
opacity identified by institutional scholars. These include practice multiplicity (the diversity of 
practices adopted by actors across socio-political and geographic spaces), behavioral 
invisibility (the difficulty in assessing the behavior of actors such as suppliers), and causal 
complexity, where a “multitude of interconnected heterogeneous actors and factors interacting 
in non-linear ways creates uncertainty about cause-effect relations” (Wijen 2014:306-7). We 
test our argument using novel qualitative and quantitative data from two “best of breed” sources 
in two studies.   
Our qualitative evidence is drawn from a detailed study of two factories of a global 
supplier, and is used to show how suppliers face practice multiplicity and decoupling as a result 
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of heterogeneous brands’ diverse rating scales and rating methodologies. Our quantitative data 
is drawn from audit records provided by a highly reputed global retailer combined with data 
from pay-slips of 1543 workers from 30 of its suppliers in China. The analysis of this data 
demonstrates global retailer experiences behavior invisibility and decoupling in auditing 
suppliers in diverse locations, even when auditing supposedly easy-to-measure outcomes such 
as wages and hours. Finally, we demonstrate that well-established causes of compliance 
identified in prior private regulation literature have uncertain effects in this case, when 
examined in conjunction with a variety of other variables such as supplier and worker 
characteristics suggesting some uncertainty regarding cause3-effect relations.   
 In showing how opacity and practice-outcomes decoupling exists in even highly 
motivated leading brands and suppliers, our contribution to the private regulation literature is 
to outline an alternative, systemic explanation for the practice-outcomes gaps noted. In 
essence, we suggest that it is not only the problems with symbolic adoption or individual 
elements of the private regulation model that contribute to its lack of effectiveness, but that 
the complex ways in which actors interact in an opaque field also plays an important role. In 
so doing, we also make a modest contribution to institutional theory by testing and extending 
recently advanced arguments to private regulation of labor standards in global supply chains.    
Germane Literature  
 As is well established (e.g., Bartley 2007; Elliott and Freeman 2003), the inability of 
governments to effectively enforce their labor laws in apparel sourcing locations, coupled 
with pressure from activists and consumers, forced global apparel firms to adopt private 
regulation in the early 1990s.  Although private regulation takes many forms, such as 
certification and reporting systems (e.g., Goodweave, Global Reporting Initiative, UN Global 
Compact), the most common form is through corporate codes of conduct. The key elements 
of the model are that companies articulate a code of conduct for their supply chain (either 
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directly or adopting the code of conduct of a multi-stakeholder institution), engage in 
“auditing” (again directly or through third parties) to evaluate the extent to which supplier 
factories comply with their code1, and then use these results to direct the factories to 
“remediate”, rewarding the factories that do and punishing those that don’t.  These three 
design elements have not changed significantly since their introduction in the early 1990s, 
and this form of private regulation has been widely adopted in many industries such as  toys, 
electronics, accessories, jewelry, aquaculture, food processing, furniture, household products, 
office supplies, pharmaceuticals and many more.    
Consequently, there has been growth in the associated “ecosystem” of private 
regulation. The ecosystem includes  a number of independent “social auditing” businesses  
(e.g., Verite, SGS, Intertek, ELEVATE);  multi-stakeholder standard setting organizations 
(e.g., Fair Labor Association [FLA), Ethical Trading Initiative [ETI),  Social Accountability 
International [SA]);  organizations involved in providing platforms for sharing of auditing 
information (e.g., Sedex);  private foundations (e.g., C&A Foundation);  student 
organizations (e.g., United Students against Sweatshops); and critical NGOs (e.g., Oxfam, 
Labor behind the Label) who focus on pressuring global brands to improve labor and 
environmental standards in their supply chains.  More recently, new multi-stakeholder 
organizations have evolved to facilitate coordination among brands, such as the Bangladesh 
“Accord” on Fire and Building Safety.  
There is growing consensus, however, that the growth in the private regulation eco-
system has NOT been accompanied by a steady improvement in labor standards in global 
supply chains. Although the number of empirical studies is limited, they point to only a 
modest increase in overall compliance, but with continuing violations of many labor 
                                                 
1
 Hence the use of the term compliance.  A fundamental assumption is that better compliance leads to better 
outcomes for workers.  
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standards. This is evident in several studies, for example, the analyses of auditing scores from 
Nike and HP (Locke et al. 2007; Distelhorst et al. 2015); the analysis of audit data from 
specialized auditing firms (e.g., Toffel et al. 2015, 2018); the analysis of audit data from 
multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the FLA (Anner 2012; Stroehle, 2017) and Fair Wear 
Foundation (Egels-Zanden and Lindholm 2015); and semi-public auditing reports by ILO’s 
Better Factory Cambodia (BFC) project (Oka 2010a, b; Ang et al. 2012). A variety of 
investigative reports from NGOs reach similar conclusions (e.g., Oxfam, Labor Behind the 
Label).  
These studies indicate that compliance varies across the different audit datasets and 
across different labor issues. The variation in overall compliance with specified standards 
across industries is large, ranging from low levels of compliance in the toy sector (Egels-
Zanden and Lindholm 2014:35) to an average compliance level of approximately 65% among 
Nike’s 575 suppliers from 2002 to 2005 (Locke et al. 2007:10). Compliance is generally 
weaker in respect of “enabling rights” such as freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, relative to other rights such as freedom from child labor (e.g., Bartley and Egels-
Zanden 2015). There is a general absence of steady improvement. Locke (2013:31) notes that 
supplier factories “cycle in and out of compliance” and that, suggestive of a plateau effect,  
average compliance rates of all NIKE suppliers between the 2001-2004 period and the 2009-
2012 period look remarkably similar. Evidence from qualitative case studies complement the 
evidence from the empirical studies above (Egels-Zanden 2007; Ngai 2005; Lund-Thomsen 
et al. 2012; Yu 2008; Esbenshade 2004; Barrientos and Smith 2007; Anner 2012; Egels-
Zandén and Lindholm 2015; Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; Locke et al. 2007; Koçer and Fransen 
2009; Applebaum and Lichtenstein 2016), as does evidence from worker surveys (e.g. Chan 
and Siu 2010).  
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Prior research has generated explanations for the lack of compliance and identified 
compliance correlates. Studies have identified problems with each of the three elements in the 
model. An early criticism focused on the multitude of codes and standards adopted by 
companies, which results in audit fatigue for multi-brand suppliers, affecting their ability to 
comply effectively. The Auditing element has attracted the most attention as a cause for 
compliance failure.  Locke (2013) argues that the assumption that reliable high quality 
information can be gleaned through the auditing process is unwarranted, given the differential 
interests of buyers and suppliers. Buyers often want suppliers to invest in greater compliance 
while simultaneously reducing the price they pay for the product. This incentivizes suppliers 
to cheat via preparing alternate sets of records, and to coach workers to give “desired” 
responses to auditors’ questions. These actions are made easier because audits are announced 
in advance. Alternatively, suppliers will subcontract production to second tier and third tier 
factories that are not the subject of brand auditing. Thus, auditing becomes an adversarial “cat 
and mouse” game, where auditors try and obtain “the elusive real data while factory 
managers offer suspicious or partial records and workers parrot answers that auditors suspect 
are coached” (Bartley et al. 2015:163).  
The relatively short duration of most audits (1-2 days) makes it difficult to uncover 
compliance violations, especially because auditors do not triangulate with off-site worker 
interviews. Auditors are generally poorly trained, and since auditing has become a low cost 
commoditized activity, there is a tendency among auditors to “satisfice” by cursory checks of 
documents and engage in a “check the box” exercises without focusing on root causes. 
Finally, there is also considerable audit fraud (where auditors are paid bribes to overlook 
violations, or when audit records are falsified). Extensive reviews of such auditing problems 
can be found in (Locke 2013:36), Bartley et al. (2015), and Short, Hugill and Toffel (2017).  
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Finally, there is little evidence that companies link future sourcing to supplier 
compliance records. This has been the least researched, given that brands have not shared their 
sourcing data. There are two problems here. First, it is not at all clear that corporations have 
modified their business models to reward more compliant factories with more orders. As 
Bartley et al. (2015: 162) suggest, “some brands and retailers have well-staffed and well-
meaning compliance departments, but these departments rarely have the power to shape 
decisions of the production/sourcing departments”. Amengual and Distelhorst’s (2019) case 
study of a company determined to link sourcing and compliance found that suppliers who 
complied received fewer orders than suppliers with lower compliance. This lack of connection 
between compliance and sourcing is a key failure in private regulation, consistent with Locke’s 
(2013) dismissal of the assumption that incentives can be designed in ways that meet all actors’ 
interests may be unwarranted. A second problem is that sourcing practices are often the root 
cause of non-compliance. Through low prices and short turnaround times, brands “squeeze” 
suppliers (Anner 2018), who react by violating labor standards (Oxfam 2010; Barrientos et al. 
2011). Short turnaround times, coupled with unpredictable order changes often lead to 
excessive overtime (Locke 2013), as managers drive workers to fulfil orders out of fear of 
losing the customer’s business. Yet, the private regulation model does not build-in sourcing 
practices as a key element.     
Concerning determinants of compliance, scholars have suggested that leverage, i.e., the 
percentage of a factory’s production purchased by the brand, is an important driver of 
compliance (Fitjar 2011). But leverage is not typically high as suppliers tend to apportion their 
capacity among many brands to diversify market risk, consistent with Locke’s (2013) argument 
that the assumption of asymmetric power relations where large buyers have tremendous 
influence over their suppliers may be unwarranted. There is some evidence that long-term, 
collaborative relationships (relational contracting) could improve compliance (Frenkel and 
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Scott 2002; Locke et al. 2007; Locke and Roomis 2010; Oka 2010b; Knudsen 2013; Distelhorst 
et al. 2015; Toffel et al. 2015).   
Other correlates of compliance include the institutional context.  Compliance is 
generally better in host countries with stronger protective and effective labor law enforcement 
(Koçer and Fransen 2009; Toffel et al. 2015), or in factories in countries where leading brands 
are involved in multi-stakeholder initiatives (Oak 2010 a, b), such as the ILO’s Better Work 
Program.  Organizational characteristics of brands and suppliers have also been linked to 
compliance where larger suppliers often exhibit better compliance, given their managerial 
capacity and resources to invest in better working conditions (Moran 2002; Baumann-Pauly et 
al. 2013).  MNC-owned suppliers comply more than independently owned factories (Mosley 
2010). An argument has been made that corporate governance matters, with privately owned 
companies more likely to have better private regulation programs than publicly listed 
companies (Quinn 1997; Fulop et al. 2000). Furthermore, He and Perloff (2013) find that 
auditing results in better compliance for Chinese migrant workers. 
Summing up extant research, Bartley et al. (2015) note that “existing evidence suggests 
that they [private regulation programs] have had some meaningful but narrow effects on 
working conditions and the management of human resources, but the rights of workers have 
been less affected, and even on the issues where codes tend to be most meaningful, standards 
in many parts of the (apparel) industry remain criminally low in an absolute sense”. We still 
do not have many examples of sustained improvement in all labor standards in the global 
apparel supply chain which likely accounts for the growing consensus that the private 
regulation model has failed to deliver (Nova and Wegemer 2016). There are considerable gaps 
in our knowledge given that the vast majority of companies have been generally unwilling to 
publicly share compliance and sourcing data (private regulation, after all is, private!). 
Consequently, we know relatively little about the variation in practices within and across 
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industries, what constitutes best practice, or why there has not been sustainable progress in 
labor standards in global supply chains generally. As more and more companies adopt the 
model in diverse industries, it becomes crucial to explain why the general practice-outcomes 
gap exists. To do so, we turn to recent developments in institutional theory.  
Theory and Arguments 
Institutional theorists have studied organizations’ responses to regulative and 
normative rules. Within this domain, organizational decoupling has received extensive 
attention, building on Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) explanation for the observed gap between 
formal policies and actual practices. Much of the literature has focused on this policy-practice 
gap, specifically why organizations adopt policies but do not implement them (Bromley and 
Powell 2012). Institutionalists have argued that policy-practice gaps typically occur when 
organizations respond to rationalizing pressures from the environment, e.g., adopting an 
“externally-induced” rule to gain “legitimacy” or to avoid legal sanction through “symbolic 
adoption”, meaning that policies are adopted but not implemented at all or implemented so 
weakly “that they do nothing to alter daily work routines” (Bromley and Powell 2012: 7, 15). 
The argument is also that policy-practice decoupling is more evident early in the adoption 
process, where there is weak capacity to implement policies, and where internal constituents 
do not reinforce the external pressures for the policies (ibid 13-14). However, with time, even 
policies that are symbolically adopted sometimes become integrated into the organization, 
particularly if they are monitored through hard and soft law channels. This is clearly the case 
with private regulation regarding labor practices, as most firms have implemented their 
regimes, with formal organizational structures (such as CSR/labor practice departments) and 
practices. Hence the symbolic adoption argument may not fully explain the general 
ineffectiveness of private regulation.   
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A new strand of institutional theory hypothesizes the existence of a second decoupling 
form, i.e., means-ends decoupling, when formal structures are adopted, work activities are 
changed, policies are implemented, but where scant evidence exists to show that these activities 
are linked to organizational effectiveness or outcomes, resulting in practice-outcome gaps 
(Bromley and Powell 2012; Wijen 2014; Briscoe and Murphy 2012). This form of decoupling 
is argued to be more prevalent when external pressures are institutionalized via hard or soft law 
in opaque institutional fields, where “observers have difficulty identifying the characteristics 
of prevailing practices, establishing causal relationships between policies and outcomes and 
precisely measuring the results of policy implementation” (Wijen 2014: 302), as opposed to 
more transparent fields where these issues are clear. Therefore, field opacity contributes to 
means-ends decoupling such that even if the problem of symbolic adoption were resolved, there 
would still be inconsistencies between adopted practice and outcomes.  Such decoupling does 
not necessarily indicate organizational failure, but it “could well be the most functionally 
effective path in the face of constraints, and it may nonetheless confer legitimacy” (Bromley 
and Powell 2012: 6). Field opacity and means-ends decoupling may explain why the private 
regulation model continues to be adopted, despite reports of its ineffectiveness.  
 Wijen (2014) has identified three features of opaque institutional fields that impede 
compliance with sustainability standards on socio-environmental issues.  The first is practice 
multiplicity, the diversity of practices adopted by actors spreading across different 
geographic, institutional, economic and cultural contexts that make it difficult to identify and 
engage in compliant behavior. Simply put, “the higher the number of divergent practices 
encountered, the more difficult it is for adopters to exhaustively understand and compare the 
merits and limitations of different practices, resulting in ambiguity” (ibid:305). A second 
characteristic is “behavioral invisibility”, i.e., the difficulty to observe and measure the 
behavior of actors, especially when actors operate in remote locations (most suppliers are 
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located in the third world). Behavioral invisibility enables suppliers who have a low incentive 
to disguise their non-compliance or “pretend to be substantively compliant” (ibid:307). The 
third key feature of field opacity is causal complexity, (uncertainty regarding cause-effect 
relations) given that heterogeneous actors and practices are interconnected in a given context  
in complex ways to drive impact (ibid:306). The existence of complex causes and uncertain 
effects (ibid) undermine adopters’ ability to understand the critical drivers of compliant 
behavior, inhibiting their ability to implement effective practices.   
 Wijen’s (2014) major contribution to this literature is to suggest that adopters and 
regulators (he calls them institutional entrepreneurs) in opaque fields face a tradeoff or 
dilemma in their efforts to induce compliance and achieve envisaged goals. On the one hand, 
the three features of opaque fields may drive regulators to introduce concrete and uniform 
rules, strong incentives, and transfer of best practices to reduce opacity and induce 
compliance (ibid:304). On the other hand, these standardized rules and verification systems 
may resolve the symbolic adoption problem, but are more likely to cause practice-outcome 
decoupling because the complexity and diversity of actions and contexts call for “holistic and 
context-contingent approaches”, “which is at odds with the nature of the typical compliance-
oriented institutions” (ibid:305). Hence, regulators face a tradeoff or dilemma because 
remedying policy-practice decoupling may enhance the gap between practice and outcomes 
as compliance-oriented institutions will constrain the agency of adopters to act in diverse 
contexts.  
Wijen approaches the problem of decoupling in opaque fields mainly from the 
regulator’s perspective, i.e., how to design rules and mechanisms to reduce the trade-off, and 
suggests several alternatives. These include the development of a systemic mindset to deal 
with the multi-level complexity in opaque fields, stimulating internalization among those who 
are more likely to decouple policies and practices (such as suppliers) through supplier clubs 
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and capability building to reduce behavioral invisibility, and the development of niche 
institutions to translate universal approaches to more context-sensitive ones.  
 We draw on these ideas in this paper, but we extend it in two ways. First, while Wijen 
alludes to heterogeneous actors when explaining causal complexity and practice multiplicity, 
how they create field opacity is not his central concern, as he focuses on rule design and 
regulators’ dilemmas. We extend his argument by focusing more on demonstrating how actor 
heterogeneity results in field opacity. While this is a minor shift in emphasis, it helps us 
uncover new implications for practice such as the need for coordination among 
heterogeneous actors to improve labor conditions.   Second, while Wijen’s arguments 
concern socio-environmental regulation generally, we develop specific arguments regarding 
the pathways through which heterogeneous actors cause opacity in the organizational field of 
private regulation regarding labor practices in supply chains.      
 Our general argument is that actor heterogeneity contributes to field opacity in ways 
that result in practice-outcome decoupling. Specifically, we propose that heterogeneous 
brands contribute to practice multiplicity in four ways. First, different brands adopt different 
private regulation policies, resulting in diverse demands on suppliers.  Second, heterogeneous 
global firms use diverse audit practices to assess suppliers. Third, these firms use a 
multiplicity of rating scales to assess supplier compliance, resulting in conflicting “grades” 
for the supplier. Finally, different brands assign varying weights for different violations. 
Together, these result in inconsistent ratings that make it difficult for suppliers to comply 
with conflicting demands from brands and achieve divergent goals at the same time, 
enhancing the gap between brands’ multiple practices and intended improvement in labor 
standards.  
            We further argue that supplier heterogeneity increases the difficulty for auditors to 
detect violations of code of conduct provisions, thereby contributing to behavioral invisibility 
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(the inability to readily observe the behavior of actors). Supplier heterogeneity manifests in 
three ways. First, suppliers are typically located in different countries and regions, posing 
measurement challenges to auditors who need to be aware of the variety of local laws and 
standards affecting code provisions with respect to labor issues. For instance, codes of 
conduct normally stipulate that suppliers should comply with social insurance regulations, but 
with regard to China, these regulations vary across provinces, and change frequently. Second, 
suppliers (especially those supplying to multi-product global retailers) vary in terms of the 
products they produce and the industries they operate in. This variation poses measurement 
challenges for auditors using a standard code of conduct, as industry rules and regulations 
vary widely, particularly with regard to health and safety issues. Third, employment practices 
of suppliers vary. Shift work, flexible work schedules, payment of different allowances, and 
patterns of record keeping, among others, make it difficult for auditors to readily assess 
overtime hours, wage compliance, and leave taking, because a standardized code of conduct  
does not take into account such variations. These types of heterogeneity make it difficult to 
accurately assess even relatively easy-to-measure issues such as wages and hours, and 
especially given the short time frame of a typical audit. Given these measurement difficulties, 
we suggest that audit score (the usual metric that global companies rely on to assess their 
private regulation efforts), may not be the most reliable indicator.    
 Finally, we argue that actor (worker, supplier, and brand) heterogeneity contributes to 
causal complexity such that it is difficult to causally attribute worker outcomes to elements of 
private regulation. As industrial relations scholars have long known, numerous inter-related 
factors (institutional factors, employer characteristics and workforce attributes) can impact 
workplace outcomes. These complex causes of worker outcomes may overshadow the effects 
of private regulation such as long-term buyer-supplier relationships and high leverage (the 
share of a supplier’s capacity accounted for by a brand) which have been linked with 
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compliance in prior studies. Complicating this further, the variation in global brands 
interactions with their suppliers creates uncertainty regarding what works and what are 
effective practices in that context. Therefore, given complex causal patterns, private 
regulation variables may have uncertain effects in different contexts.   
  In sum, these new institutional perspectives constitute a promising approach to 
examine private regulation in action, as they outline how field opacity occurs, resulting in 
organizational decoupling. This permits the articulation of an alternative organizational-field 
based explanation for the practice-outcomes gap with regard to private regulation of labor 
standards. While Wijen (2014) and others have made several suggestions to increase coupling 
such as the need for transparency and niche institutions, Bartley and Egels-Zanden (2015) 
point to how unions and others could leverage symbolic commitments to create a more 
“contingent coupling”. Our recommendations take these approaches into consideration.  But 
our key contribution in this paper is to illustrate how opacity is created by extending Wijen’s 
arguments to emphasize the role of actor heterogeneity in fostering practice multiplicity, 
behavior invisibility and causal complexity in the labor practice organizational field. 
   
Research Strategy and Methodology 
 
We draw on two sources of data from reputed actors who have implemented private 
regulation practices. Our first source of data is from a qualitative investigation of how brand 
heterogeneity creates practice multiplicity for a large supplier (hereinafter ZZZ) 
manufacturing for about 70 global brands. ZZZ is a vertically integrated manufacturer of 
woven and knit shirts, with annual revenues in excess of $1.2 billion. ZZZ is reputed to be a 
technological leader in shirt manufacturing, with a proven managerial capacity and a well-
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developed sustainability strategy.2 As such, ZZZ is a very different entity from the 
stereotypical depiction of a low-cost garment supplier. We collected general data regarding 
audits at ZZZ by its customer brands from all its 9 factories, and specific data from its two 
most advanced factories: Factory A and Factory B in Guangdong, China. Factory A, 
established in 1992, has 4038 employees, (81% female) with mainly local (73%) rather than 
migrant workers.  It employs relatively advanced equipment (RFID identification tags, 
pattern sewing machines, button machines, auto-run collar and cuff machines) and several 
processes are automated (folding, cutting and spreading). Factory A had also met ISO9000 
and ISO14001 quality standards. Factory B was similar to Factory A in most respects, except 
that it was founded in 1998, and had 6400 employees.  
Interviews were conducted with 2 marketing managers, and 3 officers of the 
supplier’s own CSR department, including the head of sustainability, and 10 plant level 
sustainability executives (5 per factory) who were responsible for implementing sustainability 
initiatives, as well as ensuring compliance with the codes of conduct of their global 
customers.  We also interviewed the head and deputy head of manufacturing. The focus of 
our interviews, which were largely unstructured, was to understand how the factories 
experience the audits of the brands. Each of the factories supplied (at the time of our visit) to 
approximately 16 brands. As such, they constitute an appropriate location to view practice 
multiplicity of heterogeneous brands.   
      Our second source of data, drawn from a global home furnishing retailer (hereinafter 
BBB) interrogates how supplier heterogeneity contributes to measurement difficulties.   BBB 
was an early adopter of the private regulation model (2001) and is reputed for its CSR 
performance. One of BBB’s auditors provided us with extensive detail regarding BBB’s audit 
protocol and how they measure supplier compliance. By 2012, BBB had required that its 
                                                 
2
 These details are available from the authors.  
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suppliers comply with 98.6%3  of its 75-item code, allowing suppliers leeway to violate its 
code only on overtime hours. BBB’s own in-house auditors monitor supplier performance 
once every 12 months. The audit duration is two days, involving two auditors.  BBB’s audit 
manager informed us in 2013 that the company prided itself on setting a bottom-line 
compliance target for suppliers and its linkage of audit results with sourcing decisions, 
suggesting that it goes beyond symbolic adoption.  BBB provided us access to their audit 
data, because they wanted to understand how their audits impacted outcomes for workers at 
their suppliers. Their audit data contained a number of contextual attributes of suppliers, such 
as ownership, location, workforce characteristics, the length of relationships with suppliers, 
and the share of supplier production purchased by BBB.  
We focus here on the auditing of wages and hours, as these “outcome” standards (in 
contrast to process rights such as collective bargaining), because they are considered more 
easily measurable (Anner 2012; Drebes 2014:1264).    The 6 items in BBB’s code concerning 
wages and hours include (1) suppliers shall pay wages according to local laws and average 
hourly wage shall not be lower than the local minimum; (2) suppliers shall pay overtime 
compensation according to local laws; (3) weekly working hours shall not exceed 60 hours; 
(4) workers shall have at least one day off in seven days; (5) workers shall enjoy paid leave 
according to laws and local customs; and (6) payment of benefits such as social security shall 
comply with local laws. 
We then requested and received 1549 pay-slips belonging to an average of 52 workers 
in each of the 30 suppliers. These were randomly selected by an auditor from the payrolls, for 
the month of May 2013.  The pay-slips show workers’ total wages, basic wages, attendance, 
working hours, overtime hours and pay, social insurance contribution, various allowances, 
and others (see Appendix).  In the audit process, BBB requires that each worker’s payment 
                                                 
3
 BBB gave one year for existing non-confirming suppliers to meet this bottom-line compliance level. 
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information on the payroll must be signed by the worker together with his or her written legal 
identification number to ensure authenticity.  
Our strategy was to systematically measure compliance regarding four items on 
wages and hours from pay-slips.   We focus on four items based on 1549 pay-slips from 30 
suppliers as some issues such as paid leave and one day off in seven found in BBB’s code 
cannot be assessed with pay-slips for just one month. Our calculations of compliance (the 
share of workers for whom there were violations) take into account differing local and 
regional regulations and employment practices in the industries in which these 30 suppliers 
operate. We then calculate a compliance scores on these items and compare it to the audit 
score that BB’s auditors provided. Our analytical task here is to show the challenges involved 
in measuring supplier behavior by examining discrepancies between BBB’s audit score and 
our calculations of compliance. Note that the pay-slips are generated on the basis of payroll 
records which the auditors have assessed.  The only difference is that in calculating 
compliance we take into account local regulations and employment practices.  
Finally, in order to demonstrate causal complexity, we attempt to examine the causes 
of compliance using both our data sources. In a quantitative analysis of our second source of 
data, we evaluate the effect of various supplier and worker characteristics as well as private 
regulation related variables such as leverage and long term-buyer supplier relations. Given 
that Wijen (2014:306) emphasizes both complex causes as well as uncertain effects of 
different variables on compliance, we hypothesize that the effect of private regulation 
variables could have uncertain effects in this data. We supplement our analysis through 
interviews with marketing managers of ZZZ, who also report considerable variation amongst 
brands with regard to the importance of long term buyer-supplier relations.        
We thus illustrate our specific arguments regarding how actor heterogeneity drives 
opacity via practice multiplicity, behavioral invisibility, and causal complexity that results in 
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practice-outcomes decoupling. We have chosen to examine two “leading cases” where 
private regulation efforts are relatively well developed. If these cases also exhibit opacity, it 
would lend support to institutional theorists’ position that when the means and ends are 
unclear, technical procedures such as auditing become “ends in themselves” (Bromley and 
Powell 2012:36).     
Results 
Buyer Heterogeneity and Practice Multiplicity 
 As argued, we report here the different ways in which buyer heterogeneity increases 
practice multiplicity and decoupling for suppliers. In general, there is considerable variation 
in how ZZZ’s customer brands have instituted their private regulation programs, and even 
more variation in how they evaluate supplier performance. Table 1 lists general variation in 
its customers’ general private regulation approach.  
--Table 1-- 
 As Table 1 suggests, although all its customers are well-known global brands, they 
differ in terms of their private regulation approach. Eight are members of the FLA, while 17 
are members of the Sustainable Apparel Coalition and hence, leading adopters of the private 
regulation model. Surprisingly, we found that, of 74 global customers, 24 did not have a 
private regulation program with regard to ZZZ, while the others varied in the extent to which 
private regulation was implemented.  With regards to auditing, some do less than others. The 
two factories of ZZZ participating in our study (Factory A and Factory B), serviced 14 and 18 
global brands respectively. These factories experienced a total of 24 and 32 audits over the 
2014-2015 period, roughly an audit or more every month, with more than 4 audits in some 
months.4 Some brands audit the factories themselves, while a majority sub-contracts to third 
                                                 
4
 This is broadly consistent with the frequent complaint of “audit fatigue” by suppliers who service multiple 
brands.  
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party auditing firms. The majority of the audits were announced in advance, although a 
surprisingly large number were unannounced.  In 27 out of 56 cases, the brand required the 
factory to pay the auditors, a serious “design flaw” which could result in collusion between 
factory management and auditing firms. Finally, the time and costs of audits varied widely, 
from as little as one person-day to nine person-days, while the average cost per audit varied 
from as little as $645 to as much as $ 3700. Finally, a key way in which auditing varies 
across customers was the extent to which auditor’s function as “coaches who are interested in 
removing root causes of violations” versus those who simply “check the box” (Interview 2: 
ZZZ Sustainability Officer).   
 Practice multiplicity was even more apparent when we examined specifics regarding 
how different brands conduct audits.  Conducting an audit requires that auditors provide an 
overall rating of the factory (brands require the rating so that it could, “potentially” be 
factored in to their sourcing decisions). Our interviews with factory management indicated 
their frustration with the problems caused by the different rating scales used by different 
brands/auditors, and the apparent lack of a clear connection between audit violations and the 
final rating. Table 2 lists the rating scales used by different brands. The left hand column lists 
rating scales for the top 9 customers of ZZZ (by volume), while the right hand column lists 
rating scales of the bottom 8 customers. Given the differences between the rating scales, it is 
quite possible that the factory might receive a rating of “acceptable” by one brand, and 
“unacceptable” by another brand in audits conducted during the same time frame, as we 
report below. Factory CSR representatives suggested that there was little effort by brands or 
auditors to link their rating scales to the findings found in the audit.  In fact, they suggest that 
the rationale for the ratings was shared in only 57% of the audits.   
--Table 2 --  
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If the rating scales used by different brands and audit firms vary, we find variation in 
the practices of auditors that result in different findings.  We provide data below for two 
scenarios. In the first case, reported in Table 3, we examined audits done at Factory A during 
the same time frame (3/16 and 3/18, 2015, and 7/7 and 7/21, 2015) by different 
brands/auditing firms. The number and type of findings vary significantly, as do the ratings. 
Note the variation in a two-day period (the top panel of Table 3) and the variation in a two-
week period (the bottom Panel of Table 3). In the first panel, audits done just 2 days apart 
show vastly different violations for conditions that do not usually change that much. This 
suggests that either auditors of different brands and audit companies are looking for very 
different things in an audit, despite the commonality of most codes of conduct used by the 
brands, or they are not uniformly trained.   
--Table 3--  
 Therefore, we examined a second scenario (reported in Table 4), looking at audits in 
Factory B by the same auditing firm, representing 3 different brands, during the same time 
frame (9/22, 9/23 and 10/6, 2014).  Curiously, the same auditing firm (we do not know if the 
specific auditors that visited on that day were the same) found quite different violations, even 
one day apart, and even more importantly, those variations led to quite different ratings. 
While two of the ratings are in the “major deficiencies” class, one represents a much higher 
rating!  
--Table 4--  
What is absent is any indication of the weight attached to each individual item (of 
over 200 items in most audits) in arriving at the overall rating given by the auditors. It is 
possible that individual auditors have leeway to exercise their judgment on this issue, but it is 
also possible that brands give their auditors generalized guidance in arriving at these 
decisions. What these findings suggest is that there is considerable variation in what auditors 
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a) look for, b) what they actually find during their audits and c) how much weight they assign 
to each violation. Our interviews with the ZZZ’s sustainability staff suggest that the focus of 
auditing efforts i.e., what auditors look for, is often influenced by brand experiences at other 
factories or countries. For instance, following Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, most brands 
focused more on fire safety issues, relative to other issues, and fire safety violations tended to 
have a greater weightage in overall ratings in these factories during the time frame that we 
collected data. Similarly, one brand experienced a chemical safety issue in one of their 
supplier factories elsewhere, and that was reflected immediately in heightened focus on 
chemical issues in the auditing of this factory.  
We found no relationship between the number of instances of non-compliance found 
and the overall ratings provided by the auditors in the 56 audits of ZZZ.  We acknowledge 
that the number of instances of non-compliance is less important than the severity of those 
issues, but it was impossible to judge severity by examining the audit reports given the 
absence of weightage information, and given that one auditor’s conception of severity might 
differ from that of another. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the audit reports 
that find a higher number of instances of non-compliance would result in a lower final rating. 
This does not appear to be the case, as the two detailed tables showing audits and rating 
results in Factory A and Factory B do not support our hypothesis. 
--Tables 5A and 5 B--  
The tables above suggest considerable heterogeneity in the way brands practice 
private regulation. There is variation in what auditors look for and find during the same 
period, the different findings are not always systematically linked to the rating scales, the 
rating scales differ from company to company, and as discussed earlier, auditors do not 
communicate the rationale for the ratings given to the factory. As noted, in 43% of audits, the 
whole purpose of educating the supplier seems to be absent. ZZZ’s chief sustainability officer 
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summarized as follows, “Our customers fall variously into two camps. One wants to do good 
and is often willing to work with us, while others just follow rigid rules, with a ‘check-off 
mentality’ that does not address the root causes of problems”. She added that the “brands 
differ in terms of priorities and how much compliance is important to them” (Interview 3).  
Efforts by the supplier to “regulate” this multiplicity of practices by suggesting to its long 
term clients that they just accept an audit done by someone else were adopted by just two 
global brads (see Table 9).   Thus, this multiplicity of practices among heterogeneous brands 
provides diverse or conflicting signals to the supplier, making it difficult, even for a leading 
multi-brand supplier like ZZZ, to effectively align its work conditions with different brand 
requirements.   
 Supplier Heterogeneity and Behavioral Invisibility 
 Recall that our analytical strategy was to compare BBB’s audit scores on wages and 
hours with the compliance scores calculated by us from workers’ pay-slips drawn from 
payroll records that the auditors assess. Although drawn from the same underlying data, our 
calculations of compliance take into account the effect of local regulations and employment 
practices, while we are uncertain whether BBB’s auditors do the same.  
 Column three in Table 6 shows BBB’s audit scores for the 6 items on wages and 
hours, while column four shows our calculation of compliance for four of these six items 
(hourly wage, monthly hours, overtime pay, and social security). Comparing these two 
columns reveals discrepancies with regard to monthly wages, overtime pay, and social 
security contributions. BBB’s audit scores underreport violations in 95 out of 30 suppliers 
(30%) shown underlined in bold and italic font in this table.  For instance, supplier #1 
received an audit score of 83.3% with only one violation being detected by the BBB’s audit, 
but our calculation shows that it violated two items on weekly hours and social security 
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 These are suppliers # 1, 3, 8, 9, 17, 21, 28, 29, 30.  
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contribution.  Social security payments appear to be a particular problem, as it appears that 16 
of 30 suppliers were not in compliance, and the severity of violation on social security varies 
(i.e., share of workers affected by this violation ranges from 1.8% in some suppliers to 100% 
in others). All of the nine suppliers noted above violate social security contributions based on 
pay-slip information. 
 Explaining instances in Table 6 where BBB audits reveal more “violations” than our 
computation is relatively easy as their auditors are evaluating 6 items relative to our 4, and 
because our computations rely on a month’s pay-slip data, while BBB’s auditors have access 
to payroll data for several months. Explaining why BBB’s audit scores under-report in the 
four cases is more complicated, as a number of factors could be relevant here.  
--Table 6— 
 The discrepancy noted in monthly wages is largely due to the fact that national rules 
in China require that wages and hours are reported on a monthly basis. BBB’s code, which is 
standardized for all countries, sets maximum standards on a weekly basis (60 hours) for the 
monthly wage issue (item 3). Hence, auditors must translate BBB’s weekly hours into a 
monthly hour standard and then compare this monthly standard to each worker’s recorded 
hours. Several errors could arise in this translation.  First, it may under-report the violation 
since it is unknown whether in a specific week the standard of maximum 60 hours is 
followed. Second, inaccuracy can occur in terms of how to translate weekly hours into 
monthly hours (depending on the number of days and weeks in each month). Third, errors 
may arise given that auditors have to go through the records of hundreds (or thousands) of 
workers in a short time. The same measurement challenge arises when assessing one day off 
in seven (item 4), because suppliers maintain records of total days off in a month.  It is thus 
impossible to tell when the “days off” are taken and whether item 4 is fulfilled based on 
payroll records. 
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 Assessing supplier compliance with overtime pay (item 2) is more complicated in 
China. Chinese labor law specifies three separate rates for overtime pay (1.5 times wage for 
overtime on weekdays, 2 times wage for overtime on weekends, and 3 times wage for 
overtime on national holidays). The auditors must obtain detailed overtime records from 
suppliers and compute, for each worker, whether they have been paid accurately, an 
impossible task given the short audit duration and a large number of workers. 
 Locational heterogeneity within China creates intra-country variations that make 
measurement difficult for auditors operating with a standardized code. BBB’s auditors have 
to check relevant regulations in each of the 19 cities (which may vary year by year) in order 
to measure supplier compliance with items (1) and (6). We have taken these regulations into 
account to compute compliance, but it is not clear that BBB”S auditors have done so, 
potentially accounting for the discrepancies that we find with regard to these items.  In the 
case of social security, for example, some cities allow different wage bases for calculating 
social security contributions, giving employers leeway to choose. Moreover, five of these 
cities specify different social security contribution rates for migrant versus local workers.  
            In addition, suppliers vary in terms of product-type and industry. As Table 7 suggests, 
the 30 suppliers of BBB are in a variety of industries such as textiles, metal, and lighting, 
where working environments and safety and health standards are different.  First, auditors 
have to be aware of whether workers (or a proportion of workers) in a given supplier should 
be compensated for the industry-specific health and safety risks as mandated by laws, and 
then check the pay-slips to see whether the workers have received the legally-mandated 
allowances (the first part of item 1), a  challenging task that requires auditors be familiar with 
various industries/products with regard to special allowances for a variety of health and 
safety risks. Because legally mandated allowances must be excluded from minimum wage 
standards according to Chinese law, auditors must check whether suppliers indeed comply 
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with minimum wage standards after these allowances are deducted.  Our calculations take 
into account these industry and firm nuances, whereas it is unclear that BBB”s auditors are 
aware of them.6.  
            Finally, employment practices of suppliers vary, complicating accurate measurement 
by auditors. In many industries, employers are allowed to adopt “flexible work schedules” or 
“irregular working hours systems” to adjust to fluctuating orders. Under these regimes, 
suppliers do not need to comply with the monthly overtime regulations for any specific 
month, as long as the average monthly overtime hours in a quarter or in a year meet the legal 
standards. Alternatively, they may be given compensatory hours off in lieu of overtime 
payments. Auditors however, will look for maximum hours per week, without taking into 
account these nuances, as it will not be easily apparent in payroll records. And it is also 
unlikely that auditors will be able to accurately assess the “sophisticated” compensation 
management practices that Chinese employers use to circumvent tax and labor regulations, 
such as including various allowances into total wages, to artificially increase the wage level7   
In sum, we suggest that measuring supplier performance on wages, hours and social 
security payments can be quite complex given supplier heterogeneity with regard to location, 
industry, and employment practices, in the context of an extremely short audit duration of 
two days, and the need for BBB’s auditors to measure supplier behavior on 75 different 
items, some of which take even longer to audit than wages and hours. These difficulties in 
measuring issues that hitherto considered easy-to-measure have not been addressed in prior 
                                                 
6
 Given this, we acknowledge that our own assessment of compliance with overtime hours and compensation 
based on information from pay-slips, cannot be accurate for all suppliers.  
 
7
 A common practice. Chinese law provides that allowances for commuting, meals, and dormitory should be 
excluded from minimum wage standards, while allowances for skills, seniority and cell phone plans must be 
included. However, these allowances are not differentiated and indicated in payroll records, making it 
impossible to assess compliance accurately.  
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research on auditing. Such heterogeneity likely accounts for the discrepancies between audit 
scores and pay-slip information.     
Actor Heterogeneity and Causal Complexity 
 We had argued that worker outcomes are a function of many complex causes, 
including supplier characteristics and worker attributes as well as private regulation variables. 
Furthermore, these various causes may have uncertain effects in complex fields, resulting in 
“effect uncertainty” or “response uncertainty”, that Wijen alludes to in his conception of 
causal complexity (2014:306). In our quantitative analysis, we examine whether three private 
regulation variables, namely, the audit scores, leverage (the percentage of supplier production 
accounted for the global buyer) and the length of the relationship between buyer and various 
suppliers are related to compliance, in addition to other potential causes such as supplier 
characteristics and worker attributes.      
 To this end, we compute a compliance index for each worker based on their pay-slips 
from BBB.  For instance, a worker would receive a compliance index score of .75 if he/she 
experienced only one violation out of four items on wages and hours. Since compliance 
outcomes for individual workers are nested within 30 suppliers, we use multilevel8 linear 
regression to analyze antecedents of compliance outcomes for workers. Table 8 reports these 
results.  
Table 8 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 8 test the effects of private regulation related variables: audit 
scores, BBB leverage (share in the supplier’s production ranging from 15-100%), and years 
supplying BBB (between 3 to 15 years). None of them are statistically significant predictors 
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 Some suppliers may comply systematically better than others and thus supplier level variables may influence 
individual level outcomes. 
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of better compliance, with or without controlling for other causes of compliance. This 
suggests that private regulation variables effect is uncertain, at best.   
On the other hand, Model 2 in Table 8 shows multiple contextual causes of 
compliance beyond private regulation variables. Several supplier characteristics and worker 
attributes are significantly associated with better compliance. These include supplier 
ownership (with foreign-owned or foreign-invested suppliers showing higher compliance 
than suppliers owned by Taiwanese or Macao companies/individuals), location (suppliers 
located in Jiangsu and Zhejiang exhibit higher compliance than those in Shanghai), and size 
(positively related to compliance). Among worker attributes, Hukou (household registration), 
gender (male), tenure, and age relate positively and significantly with better compliance. 
Compliance was generally better for workers who have an urban Hukou relative to a rural 
Hukou. Taken together, Models 1 and 2 show that there are complex causes of compliance 
for workers including supplier and worker heterogeneity, while the effects of private 
regulation-related variables are uncertain in this sample.  
Qualitative evidence from ZZZ complements the above analysis in a more indirect 
way. ZZZ has had long term relationships (over 15 years) with many of the brands.  Prior 
research has suggested that long-term relationships result in better appreciation and 
knowledge of the supplier’s ability to comply with the code. An outcome of long term trust 
based relationships is the reduced need for auditing.  In the case of factories A and B, the 
results are quite mixed.  As Table 9 suggests, 8 out of 15 brands with relationships exceeding 
10 years continue to do audits regularly, while 7 of the brands do not require an audit or are 
content to accept a generic audit or ZZZ’s internal audit. These heterogeneous responses from 
buyers make factory managers uncertain about the benefits of long-term relationships, as they 
do not seem to know how brands make decisions to conduct or not conduct audits. 
--Table 9-- 
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 Marketing managers of ZZZ, a leading highly compliant supplier, suggest that their 
experience with auditing shows that there is little or no coupling between brands auditing 
practices and sourcing practices. So, the aspect of rewarding compliant suppliers with orders, 
a key element of the private regulation model, seems absent in this case.  One marketing 
manager indicated that the “idea that long-term relationships will result in repeated/advance 
orders is ludicrous” and that customers “see themselves as free to make changes anytime”. 
Another noted that even long-term customers “will often defect” after placing their orders. As 
such, brands’ unpredictable behavior makes factory managers uncertain about what secures 
stable orders, without which it is difficult to continuously improve compliance and outcomes 
for workers. Since the link between auditing and sourcing is crucial to compliance through 
the incentive effects, the absence of this link in cases where leverage is high and relationships 
are long-term (both best case scenarios) is problematic. Taken together, these results suggest 
that there are complex causes of compliance, the effects of private regulation are uncertain in 
different contexts, and supplier factory managers are uncertain about what works, illustrating 
causal complexity that creates decoupling of private regulation and outcomes.  
Discussion 
 The key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how actor heterogeneity generates 
field opacity via practice multiplicity, behavioral invisibility and causal complexity in ways 
that result in decoupling of private regulation practices from outcomes for both brands and 
suppliers. In so doing, we provide support for the construction of an organizational-field 
based explanation for the general lack of sustained improvements in worker outcomes in 
global supply chains. This field-level explanation does not mean that the critiques of 
individual elements of private regulation model identified in prior literature (Locke 2013) 
lack explanatory power. The value of the institutional approach is that it provides a more 
“systemic” explanation for low compliance across diverse institutional contexts, and 
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company supply chains. Furthermore, it suggests several specific and general implications for 
the practice of private regulation, while also allowing us to evaluate contemporary 
developments in the field.    
  In specific terms, based on our evidence regarding brand heterogeneity which creates 
practice multiplicity for supplier ZZZ, a key element is the need for multi-brand co-
ordination in terms of auditing approaches in the case of factories who service multiple 
brands. At present, such co-ordination is absent. Such a collaboration is consistent with 
Wijen’s (2014) notion of niche institutions “tailored to specific contexts”. In this case, the 
context is multiple brands sourcing from the same supplier, and could serve to reduce 
practice multiplicity. Contemporary examples of such niche institutions include the 
Bangladesh Accord on Fire Safety and its sibling organization, the Alliance for Bangladesh 
Safety, both of which involve collaboration between global brands to improve safety in 
Bangladesh factories. The Indonesian Freedom of Association protocol is another 
contemporary example of a context specific niche institutions.  The implications of our 
results regarding supplier and worker heterogeneity is that brands in the apparel or home 
retailing company chains could collaborate to establish regional or provincial consortia with 
their suppliers to devise effective frameworks for auditing with regard to wages and hours 
regionally and locally.  
 Furthermore, such consortia of brands and their suppliers in a particular region may 
stimulate the suppliers to internalize the principles and goals of private regulation, another 
solution recommended by Wijen to decrease opacity and the tradeoffs between the two forms 
of decoupling. At a more general level, consistent with his arguments (2014:313), such 
internalization could also be stimulated by stricter selection procedures by multi-stakeholder 
institutions of which global companies are members. For example, they could require their 
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members to more closely integrate sourcing with compliance as a condition of membership, 
which they do not do currently.   
 Of course, we acknowledge that such coordination among global buyers will not 
solve the many other issues that cause behavioral invisibility (such as auditors’ inability to 
process information in the short time frame provided). The variety of difficulties involved in 
measuring suppliers’ performance in labor practices suggests that the labor practice field may 
be more opaque than the environmental field, since information on labor practices and 
intended outcomes are dispersed among thousands of workers across different suppliers, 
while environmental effects can be much more easily observed. Wijen (2014) treats social 
(including labor) and environmental issues similarly in making his argument.  In this sense, it 
is important for future research to develop specific hypotheses with regard to the causes of 
opacity in labor practices, as we have done in this paper.   
Using a decoupling lens permits us to evaluate a contemporary development in labor 
practices in global supply chains. A current effort under-way is that of the Social and Labor 
Convergence Project (SLCP), a consortium of brands and large suppliers which aims to 
develop an audit tool and a uniform verification (auditing) methodology for all types of 
global suppliers everywhere. Over 75 global companies and suppliers have signed on to this 
initiative, which is in the early stages of development. Wijen’s arguments regarding causal 
complexity would suggest that such an effort, at best, might solve symbolic adoption issues, 
but will otherwise fail to realize its expected outcomes, given that it hews towards uniformity 
across multiple  contexts that require a more differentiated approach, potentially constraining 
actor’s agency to act in context-dependent ways.  
 Our results regarding the importance of worker heterogeneity raises the question of 
how they might be involved in private regulation. Since workers are the ones who know their 
work situation and working conditions better than any other actor, involving them in the 
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auditing process, or providing them with a role to implement codes of conduct, would help 
reduce opacity caused by behavioral invisibility. Indeed, recent research (Bartley and Egels-
Zanden 2015) suggests that worker and union agency could shrink (though not eliminate) the 
gap between practices and outcomes, a process they call “contingent coupling”. Involving 
workers (a key actor affected by private regulation who has been hitherto left out of the 
process) would also contribute to the generation of a systemic mindset, given Wijen’s 
(2014:313) argument that collaboration among all relevant actors could accomplish this 
objective.   
More generally, creating a systemic mindset among diverse inter-connected actors 
also requires identifying major and minor causes and uncertain effects of important variables 
(Wijen 2014:313), if we are to transform the opaque field of labor practices under private 
regulation to a more transparent one.  One way in which causal complexity could be reduced 
is if actors such as global companies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and auditing firms would 
publicly disclose the data and their analyses regarding the effects of their private regulation 
practices. This level of transparency does not exist in the private regulation field currently, as 
most brands and multi-stakeholder institutions do not publicly disclose any data9. Over the 25 
years since private regulation was adopted, various multi-stakeholder institutions, such as the 
Fair Factories Clearinghouse, have amassed a large amount of data, but it is unclear how their 
analyses (which are private) provide evidence of the direct and indirect effects of causal 
variables in different contexts. More transparency through public disclosure is a necessary 
step to reduce the causal complexity that generates opacity and decoupling. In the few cases 
where such data was made available to the research community, Locke (2013), Toffel et al. 
(2015), Short et al (2017), and Amengual and Distelhorst (2019) for example, have made 
invaluable contributions in identifying causal relationships. 
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 The FLA does disclose a percentage of their audit results.  
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If the institutional approach used in this paper has been useful in showing how actor 
heterogeneity generates practice multiplicity, behavioral invisibility, and causal complexity to 
produce the opacity that results in the practice-outcomes gap, it also has the potential to 
explain why global firms continue with the private regulation model despite its demonstrated 
ineffectiveness in the labor standards arena. For example, Bromley and Powell (2012) argue 
that in opaque institutional fields when the link between means and ends is unclear, 
monitoring and evaluation become ends in themselves, as they serve to confer legitimacy in 
the face of normative external pressures. Although we do not specifically “test” this idea, our 
results with regard to ZZZ show that the brands sourcing from it practice auditing as an 
annually recurring, low cost, outsourced, “check the box” activity, which does not seem to be 
related to actual compliance, and is clearly decoupled from their sourcing practices.    
 In sum, our paper suggests that institutional theory has much to offer as a theoretical 
anchoring for examining private regulation in the labor standards arena. In ways that prior 
explanations do not, it offers an alternative and systemic field-level explanation for the 
practice-outcomes gap, and generates implications for how private regulation can be 
improved in the future.  
Conclusion 
 Private regulation of labor standards in global supply chains has been increasingly 
adopted in diverse industries since the 1990s. However, scholarly evidence suggests that the 
private regulation model has not generated sustainable improvements in working conditions 
in the global supply chain, evidenced by a continuing gap between the practices adopted and 
the expected outcomes. Violations of labor standards continue to be quite common. One 
explanation for the lack of sustained improvement rests on the idea that organizations 
“symbolically adopt” private regulation practices, while other explanations point to flaws in 
the individual elements of private regulation or organizational failures in implementation.   
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 Using new arguments from institutional theory regarding field opacity and 
decoupling, and data from a global apparel supplier and a home products retailer, we 
demonstrate how actor heterogeneity creates field opacity in ways that result in decoupling in 
private regulation regarding labor standards.  Specifically, we argue and show that brand 
heterogeneity in terms of different auditing practices, rating scales, conflicting ratings, causes 
practice multiplicity that results in opacity for the supplier. We also highlight that supplier 
heterogeneity in locations and employment practices creates measurement challenges for 
brands to even accurately assess wages and hours that were considered easy to measure, 
resulting in gaps between brand audit scores and worker pay-slip data. Finally, we argue and 
show that complex configuration of actors in private regulation contributes to causal 
complexity, such that it is difficult to attribute worker outcomes to private regulation 
practices in some contexts and that characteristics of local actors also impact worker 
outcomes.  In so doing, we develop the building blocks of plausible alternate “organizational 
field-level” explanation for the lack of sustainable progress in labor standards in global 
supply chains.   
 Although our analysis is limited in many ways, particularly given that our qualitative 
examination spans only two supplier factories, and our quantitative study compares audit 
scores to workers’ pay-slips in only one month for a small sample of suppliers, we are able to 
demonstrate the potential of an institutional theory lens to understand progress in private 
regulation of labor standards. Future research may move beyond our efforts to study more 
specific pathways through which field opacity is generated, and examine how contextualized 
brand-supplier collaboration efforts can reduce opacity and decoupling to improve labor 
standards.  
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Table 1. Overview of Audits Experienced by Supplier ZZZ in 2014-2015
Item All Customers of  Supplier ZZZ Factory A Factory B
Number of global customers with no known P-
R program  (percent of total customers).   24 (32%) 
Customers who provide ZZZ with CoC, but 
does not audit.     9  (12%)
Customers who provide CoC but conducts 
audits regularly.   11 (15%)
Customers who provide CoC, but accepts a 
generic audits or audits of other brands.   20 (27%)
Customers who provide CoC, audit regularly, 
but also request other programs and initiatives.  10 (14%)
Total  74 (100%) 
Number of customers 14 18
Number of audits 2014-2015 24 32
Brand conducted audits 7 11
Third party audits 15 18
Number of third party audit firms 9 9
Announced audits 19 20
Surprise audits 5 11
Audit fee paid by customer 15 13
Audit fee paid by factory 9 18
Range: 1-5 Range: 1-9
Mean : 2.2 Mean : 2.6
Mean cost per audit $1,782 $1,398 
Mean cost per auditor $737 $632 
Person -days per audit  
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Table 2. Variation in Rating Scales Used by Brands in Supplier ZZZ Audits*
Rank of 
customer 
by volume
Number of 
points on 
rating scale
Scales
1 2 Acceptable-Needs improvement
2 6 Gold-Green-Yellow-Orange1-Orange2-Red
3 5 Good-Satisfying -Improvements needed-Risky-Insufficient
4 5 Gold-Silver-Bronze-Yellow-Red
5 4 Accepted-Developmental-Pending rejection-Rejected
6 - No scale
7 4 0-15, 16-49, 50-99, 100 + (not acceptable)
8 - No scale
9 3 Green (86-100), Yellow (65-85), Red (0-64)
16 5 SAT (Satisfactory)-NI (Needs improvement)-NIM (Needs major improvement)-DIA (Demands immediate action)-ZT (Zero tolerance)
< 20 4 Excellent-Good-Fair-Poor
< 20 6 CAT1 (Excellent)-CAT2 (Good)-Cat3 (Fair)-Cat4(Needs improvement-Cat5 (unacceptable)-CAT6 (Absolutely unacceptable)
<20 4 Green (Satisfactory)-Yellow (Needs improvement) -Orange (Temporary)-Red (Unacceptable)
<20 4 Green (Low risk)- Yellow (Medium risk)-Orange (High risk) -Red (Zero 
tolerance)
<20 5
Green (Satisfactory)-Yellow (Moderate violations)-Orange (Needs significant 
improvement)-Dark Orange (Substantial remediation required)-Red (Immediate 
remediation required)
<20 5
A (Green meeting compliance)-B (Yellow approaching compliance)-C (Orange 
substantial improvement required) - D(Red immediate remediation required) - F 
(Grey zero tolerance). 
Note:  *The Brands below 20 change in the relative standing of volumes, year by year. 
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Date Audit 
org
Man 
days
CoC 
category
Violation Rating
W&B 1 week delay in payment to resigned employee
Hours of 
Work 
Exceeded overtime extension permits
Hours of 
Work
Monthly overtime hours exceeds legal maximum
W&B Wage to terminated employee not paid in 7 days
Hours Buffer time exceeded 15 minutes
EHS Rolling door not working properly
No eye protection on grinding machine
No sandbag in chemical storage room
Door to dyeing room broken
Poor housekeeping issues
ER Code of Conduct not posted in location
W&B Commercial accident insurance not yet paid for new 
workers 
Smoke detector not working dormitory
3rd Party water testers not from approved list 
ER Joint fire safety program for 2 subunits not established, 
only individual fire safety program
Table 3.  Audits at the Same Factories, During the Same Time Frame, by DIFFERENT Auditing 
Firms, Produce Different Findings, Factory A, 2015 
Brand has 
rating system, 
but no rating 
given by 
auditor
Developmental 
Acceptable 
rating (No 
corrective 
action 
required)
3/18
3rd 
Party 
B
2
7/7 Brand A 2
7/21
Major 
deficiencies3/16
3rd 
Party 
A
EHS
EHS
2
Brand 
B 1
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Date Audit org CoC 
category
Violation Rating
-fire extinguishers blocked by table in floor 2
-Electricity switch boxes in major bulkhead were missing covers. 
-50% of workers had conducted consecutive work of 7-13 days 
in Jan, Feb and March 2014
-Weekly work of some employees more than 60 hours. 
HRS Monthly OT exceeded 36 hours for  employees in June-Aug 
2014, with max 92 hours in July  and 79.5 hrs in August. 
-Lower pulley guard missing for at least 10 viewed sewing 
-Need rolling doors or sliding doors for safety exits on work 
floors. Need it for 90% of cases. 
W&B Too much delay in severance payment detected
-Smoke detector Missing
-Warning sign not standard
-not using protective equipment
-health certificate of canteen staff had expired
-electrical switches not explosive proofed
-sewing machines without needle guards. 
-12/15 sample were working in excess of statutory OT limits in 
August 2014. Some worked for 70.5 hrs
-working continuously without rest
10/6
3rd Party 
Auditor 
C 
Auditing 
for 
Brand H
EHS
HRS
Good 
(Yellow 
rating), one 
step below 
highest 
Green
Table 4.  Audits by the Same Auditing Company, During the Same Time Frame, produce Differing results 
and Ratings, Factory B, 2014
9/23
3rd Party 
Auditor 
C, 
auditing 
for 
Brand B
Zero 
tolerance, 
may result 
in 
immediate 
termination
9/22
Major 
deficiencies
, Must 
improve
3rd Party 
Auditor 
C 
Auditing 
for 
Brand A
EHS
HRS
EHS
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Date Audit org
Audit 
man-
days
Type of violations
Total 
violations Rating
1/7 Brand A 2 2 HRS 2 CAT 3 
3/16 Brand B 2 1 HRS, 1W&B 2 Major Deficiencies
3/18 3rd Party A 2 2 HRS, 1 EHS, 1 W&B 4 Acceptable
4/14 3rd Party B 2  2 EHS 2 Rating system exists but not 
communicated
6/18 3rd Party C 3 4, EHS, 2 HRS, 1 W&B 7 Rating system exists but not 
communicated
6/23 Brand C 2 14 EHS, 7 ER, 5 W&B, 5HRS 32 Good
7/7 Brand D 2 7 EHS, 1 ER 8 Rating system exists but not 
communicated
7/21 Brand E 1 1W&B, 2 EHS, 1 ER 4 Developmental
9/23 3rd Party D 2 2 EHS, 1HRS,1 Harassment 4 Orange 
11/4 3rd Party A 4 1 EHS, 1 HRS, 1 W&B 3 No rating
12/17 Brand F - 10 EHS, 2 W&B, 2 HRS 14 Labor:Bronze; EHS: Yellow
12/23 3rd Party E 2 4 EHS, 1 W&B, 1 HRS 5 Green
Table 5a.  Relationship between Number of Audit Violations and Audit Ratings, Factory A, 2015
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Table 5b. Relationship Between Number of Audit Violations and Audit Ratings, Factory B, 2015
Date Audit org
Audit 
man-
days
Type of violations Total 
violations Rating
1/27 3rd Party D 1 2 EHS, 1 W&B, 1 hrs 4 Zero tolerance
2/4 3rd Party D 2 3 EHS, 1 HRS 4 Yellow
3/16 3rd Party A 2 2 EHS, 1 HRS 3 Needs improvement
5/19 3rd Party B 2 2 EHS, 2 W&B 4 Acceptable
5/26 Brand E 2 3 W&B, 2 EHS 5 Developmental
6/3 3rd Party F 2 7 EHS, 3 HRS, 2 W&B, 2 Others 14 Needs improvement
6/24  Brand C 2 40 EHS, 5 HRS, 3 W&B 2 ER, 1 
others 51 Needs improvement
10/15 3rd Party G 4 5 EHS 5 Good condition
10/26 3rd Party H 2 6 EHS, 2 W&B, 2 HRS 10 Needs improvement
11/17 Brand D 2 9 EHS 9 Rating not communicated
12/1 Brand E 2 3 EHS 3 developmental
12/17 3rd Party 4 2 2 EHS, 3 HRS, 1 W&B, 2 others 8 Needs improvement
12/29 Brand F 9 7 EHS, 3 W&B, 2 ER 1 HRS 13 Labor: Yellow;EHS: Bronze
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Table 6. Audit Scores and Payslip Violations of Wages & Hours Compared
Supplier ID
6-item 
audit score  
wages & 
hours
# of violated 
items 
reported by 
audit (out of 
6 items)
# of violated 
items revealed 
from payslips 
(out of 4 
items)
% of 
hourly 
wage 
violation
% of 
monthly 
hours 
violation*
% of 
overtime 
pay 
violation
% of social 
security 
contribution 
violation
1 83.3 1 2 0 63.3 0 100
2 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 83.3 1 2 0 0 18 62.2
4 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 50 3 0 0 0 0 0
6 66.7 2 1 0 0 0 8.2
7 66.7 2 1 0 0 0 2.0
8 83.3 1 2 0 10 0 2
9 83.3 1 2 0 0 2 6
10 66.7 2 0 0 0 0 0
11 83.3 1 1 0 12.7 0.0 0
12 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
13 83.3 1 1 0 0 0 42.4
14 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
15 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 83.3 1 1 0 1.9 0 0
17 83.3 1 2 0 2 0 4.26
18 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
19 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
20 83.3 1 0 0 0 0 0
21 83.3 1 2 0 74 0 100
22 33.4 4 0 0 0 0 0
23 33.4 4 2 0 10 0 100
24 66.7 2 1 0 0 98 0
25 83.3 1 1 0 0 0 21.4
26 66.7 2 2 0 18.3 0 1.8
27 83.3 1 1 0 0 0 88.1
28 83.3 1 2 0 0 2 10.2
29 83.3 1 2 0 14 0 71.4
30 83.3 1 2 0 88 0 100
Average of 
suppliers 
or workers
75.2 1.4 1.00 0 8.8 3.9 23
Note:  *BBB's Codes of Conduct limits maximum weekly work hours to 60 which translates into 
approximate 257 hours monthly.
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Table 7. Characteristics  of 30 BBB  Suppliers, 2012—2013
Supplier 
ID
City/Province Industry Ownership
Firm 
age 
(years)
Total 
workers
BBB 
share 
(%)
Years 
supplying 
BBB
1 Suzhou/Jiangsu Lighting HMT 6 228 90 6
2 Jiangyin/Jiangsu Textile DPE 8 1700 100 11
3 Shanghai Textile FIE 22 485 35 6
4 Kunshan/Jiangsu Misc FIE 8 65 60 15
5 Shanghai Metal FIE 13 1560 50 7
6 Yuyao/Zhejiang Misc FIE 8 122 20 4
7 Wuxi/Jiangsu Furniture DPE 7 99 90 2
8 Changshu/Jiangsu Metal DPE 21 330 40 7
9 Shaoxing/Zhejiang Misc FIE 5 120 40 5
10 Jiangyin/Jiangsu Textile DPE 12 470 10 4
11 Yichang/Hubei Metel FIE 6 175 40 6
12 Xiaoshan/Zhejiang Textile DPE 10 200 100 14
13 Liyang/Jiangsu Misc DPE 24 260 30 1
14 Yuyao/Zhejiang Furniture FIE 7 500 100 8
15 Ningbo/Zhejiang Furniture FIE 28 300 40 6
16 Anji/Zhejiang Furniture DPE 2 106 100 4
17 Ningbo/Zhejiang Misc DPE 45 242 80 4
18 Yuyao/Zhejiang Textile FIE 8 500 30 15
19 Jiangyin/Jiangsu Misc DPE 20 350 80 4
20 Yuyao/Zhejiang Metal FIE 14 550 100 6
21 Xiamen/Fujian Lighting HMT 13 200 80 9
22  Ningbo/Zhejiang Lighting DPE 20 1050 20 1
23 Tonglu/Zhejiang Furniture DPE 8 300 30 8
24 Hangzhou/Zhejiang Metal DPE 24 95 80 10
25 Ningbo/Zhejiang Metal DPE 13 150 65 6
26 Ningbo/Zhejiang Metal DPE 18 132 60 8
27 Jiaxing/Zhejiang Furniture DPE 10 360 80 8
28 Yangzhou/Jiangsu Metal DPE 11 350 80 3
29 Jinjiang/Fujian Furniture HMT 14 570 70 6
30 Jiaxing/Zhejiang Misc DPE 14 324 15 3
Average 14 400 60 7
Note:  HMT = Hong-Kong, Marcao, or Taiwan-invested; DPE = domestic 
private enterprise; FIE = foreign-invested enterprise; Misc = miscelleous  
 
 
46 
 
Private regulation variables Model 1 Model2
6-item audit score on wages & hours -0.014 -0.026
BBB share 0.000 0.001
Years supplying BBB -0.007 -0.004
Joint venture .382***
Foreign invested enterprise .362***
Domestic private enterprise 0.209*
Location (base group is Shanghai)
Jiangsu province .321***
Zhejiang province 0.205*
Non-Yantz River (Fujian & Hubei) 0.217
Industry (base group is textile)
Metal 0.01
Lighting -0.046
Furnitures -0.015
Miscellaneous -0.057
Total workers 0.000
Firm age 0.001
Worker individual attributes
Male .011**
Education (years) 0.002
Urban Hukou .025**
Age (years) .001*
Tenure (months) .0003***
Constant .987*** .435**
N 1491 1489
Log likelihood 1485 1520
Table 8. Worker Level Compliance: Private Regulation Variables, 
Firm Characteristics, and Worker Attributes 
Ownership (base group is Taiwan or Marco-invested enterprise
IV                                                     DV: individual compliance index
Note: Results based on multilevel linear regression; * p< 0.1, ** p< 
0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 9 . Long-term Relationships and Auditing Intensity
Rank of 
customer by 
volume
Years of 
business 
relationship
Number of 
audits in 
Factory A & B 
Rank of 
customer 
by volume
Years of 
business 
relationship
No audit or accept any 
audit
# 1 15 years 6 # 2 10 years Accepts supplier's own 
audit
# 3 15 years 5 # 6 10 years Accept a WRAP audit
# 4 10 years 5 # 10 10 years No audit required
# 5 10 years 10 # 12 10 years No audit required
# 7 10 years 7 # 13 3 years No audit required
# 8 10 years 3 # 14 10 years Accept any brand audit
# 9 10 years 10 # 15 <10 years No audit required
# 11 10 years 9
Relationships with relatively little “trust” Relationships with more "trust"
 
 
 
Date Department
Employe
e ID
Employe
e name
Wage 
standard
Scheduled 
work days
Scheduled 
work hours
Actual 
work 
days
Actual 
work 
hours
Basic 
wage
25/04/2013 Packaging 1259 XXX 1320 22 176 22 176 1320
Overtime 
days
Overtime 
hours
Overtime 
pay
Overtime 
on 
weekday
s
Weekday 
OT pay
Overtime 
on 
weekends
Weekend 
OT pay
Overtime 
work on 
holidays
Holiday 
OT pay
7.06 57 814 22.5 270 34 544 0 0
Performanc
e pay
Paid leave 
days
Leave 
pay
Total 
wage
Skill 
allowance
s
Other 
allowances
Social 
security
Other 
deductio
n
Take-
home 
wage
1049 1 60.69 3244 300 0 198 0 3346.00
Appendix : A Sample Pay Check 
 
 
